The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.
The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained by (the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of) Air.
From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non-simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one (Mind) (in each organism).
The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eyelids, the opening of the eyelids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the existence) of the Soul.
Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.
There is no visible mark (of the existence of the Soul), because there being contact (of the senses with the body of Yajñadatta), perception does not arise that this Soul is Yajñadatta).
And from a commonly observed mark (there is) no (inference of anything in) particular.
Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation.
(The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word ‘I’ (to other designates or objects).
If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions) as ‘I am Devadatta,’ ‘I am Yajñadatta,’ (then there is no need of inference).
As in the case of other precepts, so, if the Soul, which is grasped by perception, is also accompanied with, or comes at the top of, marks (from which it can be inferred), then, by means of, confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one object.
"Devadatta goes", "Yajñadatta goes" — in these cases, the belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference.
The transference, however, is doubtful.
Because the intuition "I" exists in one’s own soul, and because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.
The intuition of ‘I’ has the body for its object. Therefore, to say that, in ‘Devadatta goes,’ there is a transference (of epithet), is a mere fancy.
The transference, (as characterised by you), however, is doubtful.
But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra do not become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore, consciousness is not an attribute of the body).
(The soul is) not proved (only) by Revelation, since (as Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in particular, by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of "I" accompanied by the invariable divergence (of such cognition from all other things), as is the case with Sound.
Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.
Plurality of Souls is proved by status.
(Plurality of Souls follows) also from the authority or significance of the Śāstras.