हिन्दी
If it be said that (from the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) there would result the defect of leaving no scope for certain Smirits, (we say) no, because (by the rejection of that doctrine) there would result the defect of leaving no scope for some other Smritis.
And there being no mention (in the scriptures) of the other entities, (i.e., the categories beside the Pradhana), (the Sankhya system cannot be authoritative).
By this the Yoga philosophy is (also) refuted.
(Brahman is) not (the cause of the world) because this (world) is of a contrary nature (from Brahman); and its being so, (i.e., different from Brahman) (is known) from the scriptures.
But the reference is to the presiding deities (of the organs) on account of the special characterization (as ‘deities’) and also from the fact of a deity so presiding (over the functions of an organ being approved by the Sruti in other texts).
But it is seen.
If it be said (that the world, the effect, would then he) non-existent (before creation), (we say) no, for it is merely a negation (without any basis).
On account of the fact that at the time of dissolution (the cause becomes) like that (i. e., like the effect) (the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) is absurd.
But not (so) on account of the existence of illustrations.
And because of the objections (cited) (being applicable) to his own (Sankhyan) view (also).
Also, because reasoning has no sure basis (it cannot upset the conclusions of Vedanta). If it be said that it should be reasoned otherwise (so as to get over this defect), (we say) even so there will result the contingency of non-release (from this defect, with respect to the matter in question).
By this (i.e., by the arguments against the Sankhyas) (those other views) also not accepted by the wise (like Manu and others) are explained.
If it be said (that if Brahman be the cause, then) on account of (the objects of enjoyment) turning into the enjoyer, non-distinction (between enjoyer and things enjoyed would result), (we say, such distinction) may exist (all the same), as is experienced commonly in the world.
Its (of the effect) non-difference (from the cause results) from words like ‘origin’ etc.
And (because) on the existence (of the cause) is (the effect) experienced.
And on account of the posterior (i.e., the effect, which comes into being after the cause) existing (as the cause before creation).
If it be said that on account of (the effect) being described as non-existent (before creation) (the conclusion of the previous Sutra is) not (true); (we say) not so, (it being described) by another characteristic (as is seen) from the latter part of the text.
From reasoning and another Sruti text (this relation between cause and effect is established).
And like a piece of cloth.
And as in the case of the different Pranas.
On account of the other (the individual soul) being stated (as non-different from Brahman) there would arise (in Brahman) the defects of not doing what is beneficial and the like.
But on account of the statement (in the Srutis) of difference (between the individual soul and Brahman) (Brahman the Creator is) something more (than the individual soul).
And because the case is similar to that of stones (produced from the same earth) etc., the objection is untenable.
If it be said (that Brahman without extraneous aids) cannot (be the cause of the world) because (an agent) is seen to collect materials (for any construction), (we say) no, since (it is) like milk (turning into curds).
(The case of Brahman creating the world is) even like the gods and other beings in the world.
(Brahman’s being the cause of the world involves) either the possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified) or the violation of the scriptural statement that Brahman is without parts.
But (it cannot be like that) on account of scriptural texts (supporting both the apparently contradictory views) and on account of (Brahman) being based on the scripture only.
And because in the individual soul also (as in the case of magicians etc.) diverse (creation exists). Similarly (with Brahman).
And on account of the opponent’s own view being subject to these very objections.
And (Brahman is) endowed with all (powers), because it is seen (from the scriptures).
If it be said that because (Brahman) is devoid of organs (it is) not (able to create, enough endowed with powers), (we say) this has (already) been explained.
(Brahman is) not (the creator of the world) on account of (every activity) having a motive.
But (Brahman’s creative activity) is mere pastime, as is seen in the world.
Partiality and cruelty cannot (be attributed to Brahman) on account of its taking into consideration (other reasons in that matter), because (the scripture) declares (it to be) so.
If it be said (that is) not (possible) for want of any distinction in work (before creation), (we say) no, because of (the world) being without a beginning.
And (that the world is without a beginning) is reasonable and is also seen (from the scriptures).
And because all attributes (required for the creation of the world) are possible (only in Brahman, it is the cause of the world).
And that which is inferred (viz. the Pradhana of the Sankhyas can) not (be the First Cause) because (in that case it is) not possible (to account for the) design (found in the creation).
And on account of (the impossibility of such) a tendency (to create).
If it be said (that the Pradhana spontaneously undergoes modification) like (the flowing of) milk and water, (we say that) even there (it is due to intelligence).
And because (the Pradhana) is not dependent (on anything), there being no extraneous agency besides it, (its activity and non-activity cannot be explained).
And (it can) not (be said that the Pradhana undergoes modification spontaneously) even as grass etc. (turn into milk); because of its absence elsewhere (than in the female mammals).
Even accepting (the Sankhyan position with regard to the spontaneous modification of the Pradhana, it cannot be the First Cause) because of the absence of any purpose.
If it, be said (that the Purusha can direct the Pradhana) even as a (crippled) person (can direct a blind man), or a magnet (the iron filings), even then (the difficulty cannot be surmounted).
And because the relation of principal (and subordinate) is impossible (among the Gunas, the Pradhana cannot be active).
Even if it be inferred otherwise, owing to the absence of the power of intelligence (the other objections to the Pradhana being the First Cause remain).
Also because of contradictions (the Sankhyan theory) is inconsistent.
(The world may originate from Brahman) even as the great and long (triad etc.) originate from the short (and the minute dyad) or (this kind of dyad) from the infinitesimal (atom).
In either case (viz. the Adrishta, the unseen principle, inhering either in the atoms or in the soul) the activity (of the atoms) is not (possible); therefore, the negation of that (viz. of creation through the combination of atoms).
(the Vaiseshika theory is untenable) also (because if involves) a regress in infinitum on similar reasoning, since it accepts Samavaya.
And because of the permanent existence (of the tendency to act or otherwise of the atoms, the atomic theory is inadmissible).
And on account of (the atoms) possessing colour etc., the opposite (of what the Vaiseshikas hold would be true), because it is seen.
And because of defects in either case (the atomic theory is untenable).
And because (the atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons like Manu and others) it is to be completely rejected.
Even if the (two kinds of) aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would result the non-formation (of the two aggregates).
If it be said (that the formation of aggregates is possible) because of the successive causality (of Nescience etc. in the Buddha series), (we say), no, because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent thing in the series, and not of the aggregation).
And because at the time of the production of the subsequent thing (even in the series of successive causality) the antecedent thing has already ceased to exist, (it cannot be the cause of the subsequent thing).
If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (the effects being produced in spite of it) (there will result) contradiction of their (Baudha's’) proposition. Otherwise (there would result) simultaneity (of cause and effect).
Conscious and unconscious destruction would be impossible owing to non-interruption.
And in either case (i.e., whether Nescience with its offshoots meets with conscious or unconscious destruction resulting in final release) because of the objections (that arise, the Buddha position is untenable).
The case of Akasa also not being different (from the twofold destruction, it also cannot be a non-entity).
And on account of memory (the permanency of the experiencer has to be recognized).
(Existence does) not (result) from non-existence, because this is not seen.
And thus (if existence should spring from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal even by the effortless.
Non-existence (of things external) is not (true), on account of their being experienced.
And owing to the difference of nature (in consciousness between the waking and the dream state, the experience of the waking state) is not like dreams etc.
The existence (of Samskaras) is not (possible according to the Buddhas), because (external things) are not experienced.
And on account of the momentariness (of the ego-consciousness it cannot be the abode of the Samskaras).
And (as the Buddha system is) illogical in every way (it cannot be accepted).
On account of the impossibility (of contrary attributes) in one and the same thing (the Jaina doctrine is) not (true).
And in the same way (there would arise) the non-universality of the soul.
Nor (can) consistency (be gained) even (if the soul is assumed to take on and discard parts) in turn (to suit different bodies), on account of the change etc. (of the soul in that case).
And because of the permanency (of the size of the soul) at the end (i.e., on release) there follows the permanency of the two (preceding sizes, viz. those at the beginning and middle), (hence) there is no difference (as to the size of the soul at any time).
The Lord's (being merely the efficient cause of the world cannot hold good) on account of the inconsistency (of that doctrine).
And because relation (between the Lord and the Pradhana or the souls) is not possible.
And on account of the rulership (of the Lord) being impossible.
If it be said (that the Lord rules the Pradhana etc.) even as (the Jiva rules) the senses (which are also not perceived), (we say) no, because of the enjoyment etc.
(There would result from there, doctrine the Lord’s) being subject to destruction or (His) non-omniscience.
The origination (of the individual soul from the Lord) being impossible (the Pancharatra doctrine is untenable).
Nor (is it seen that) the instrument (is produced) from the agent.
Or if the (four Vyuhas are said to) possess intelligence etc., yet there is no warding off of that (viz. the objection raised in Sutra 42).
And because of contradictions (the Bhagavata view is untenable).
Akasa (is) not (created), (as it is) not so stated by the Sruti.
But there is (a Sruti text which states that Akasa is created).
(The Sruti text dealing with the origin of Akasa) is to be taken in a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of Akasa being created).
Also, from the Sruti texts (we find that Akasa is eternal).
It is possible that the same word (‘sprang’ be used in a primary) and (secondary sense) like the word ‘Brahman’.
The non-abandonment of the proposition (viz. by the knowledge of one everything else becomes known, can result only) from the non-distinction (of the entire world from Brahman). From the Sruti texts (which declare the non-difference of the cause and its effects, this proposition is established).
But in all effects whatsoever (there is) separateness, as (is seen) in the world.
By this (i.e., the foregoing explanation about Akasa) (the fact of) air (also being an effect) is explained.
But there can be no origin of the Sat (That which is i.e., Brahman), as it does not stand to reason.
Fire (is produced) from this (i.e., air), so verily says (the Sruti).
Water (is produced from fire).
Earth (is meant by the word ‘Anna’) because of the subject-matter, colour, and other Sruti texts.
But because of His reflecting only (are the subsequent elements created from the previous element in the order of creation; so) He (the Supreme Lord is the creator of air etc.). (We know this) from His indicatory marks.
(At Pralaya the elements are) indeed (withdrawn into Brahman) in the reverse order from that (of creation); and this is reasonable.
If it be said that in between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and the mind (are mentioned, and therefore that ought to be the order in creation and the inverse order in reabsorption), owing to the indication (in the Sruti texts) to that effect (which upsets the order of creation of the elements), (we say) not so, on account of the non-difference (of the intellect and the mind from the elements).
But the mention of that (viz. birth and death of the individual soul) is apt only with reference to (the bodies) of moving and stationary beings. (With reference to the soul, however,) it is secondary, on account of (those terms) depending on the existence of that (i.e., body).
The individual self is not (produced), (for it is) not (so) mentioned by the scriptures; also (on account of its) being eternal, (for so it is known) from them (the Sruti texts).
For, this very reason (viz. that it is not created), (the individual soul is) intelligence (itself).
(The individual soul must be atomic in dimension owing to the mention in the Vedas) of its departure from the body, going (to the next world by following a course) and coming back (from there).
(The soul's atomicity stands confirmed) owing to the relation of one’s own soul with the latter two facts (viz., following of a course and coming back).
And the latter two (the going and coming) (being connected) directly with their agent (the soul), (it is of atomic size).
If it be said (that the soul is) not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise (i.e., all-pervading), (we say) not so, for (the one) other than the individual soul (i.e., Supreme Brahman) is the subject-matter (in those texts).
And on account of direct statements (of the Sruti texts as to the atomic size) and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic).
If it be objected that (the argument holds good in the case of sandal paste) owing to its peculiarity of position, (but that is not evident in the case of the soul), then we say, no, (a peculiar location) for the soul is admitted in the Upanishads, for it exists in the heart.
If it be said that on account of the particular position (of the sandal-paste in the body the analogy is not just), (we say) not so, on account of the admission (by the scriptures of a special seat for the soul, viz.) in the heart alone.
Or owing to (its) quality (viz. intelligence) as in the world.
The extension (of the quality of intelligence) beyond (the soul, in which it inheres) is like odour (which extends beyond the fragrant object). Thus also (the Sruti) declares.
On account of the separate teaching (of the Sruti) (that the soul so pervades the body owing to its quality of intelligence).
But that declaration (as to the atomic size of the soul) is on account of it having for its essence the qualities of that (viz. the Buddhi), even as the Intelligent Lord (Brahman, which is all-pervading, is declared to be atomic).
And there is no defect (in what has been said in the previous Sutra), (as the conjunction of the soul with the intellect exists) so long as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists, because it is so seen (in the scriptures).
On account of the manifestation (of the connection with the intellect in the awakened state) being possible only on its existing (potentially in Sushupti), like virility etc.
Otherwise (i.e., if the intellect or mind be not accepted) there would result either perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception, or else the limitation of the power of either of the two (viz. the soul or the senses).
(The soul is) an agent, on account of scriptural (injunctions) having a meaning on that ground only.
And on account of (the Sruti) teaching (its) wandering about.
On account of its taking (the organs).
Also, on account of the (the scriptures) mentioning (the soul as an agent) with respect to action. If it were not so, the reference (would have been) of a different kind.
As in the case of perception, (there is) no rule (here also).
On account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi or Intellect, which is inadmissible).
And (the soul must be an agent) because (a contrary supposition will) lead to a negation of deep meditation (on Brahman).
And even as a carpenter is both.
But (even) that (agency of the soul) is from the Supreme Lord (Self); so, declares the Sruti.
But (the Lord’s making the soul act) depends on works done (by it); (thus only would) injunctions and prohibitions etc. be relevant.
(The soul is) part (of the Lord) on account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise also (i.e., as non-different from Brahman); for in some (Sakhas or recensions of the Vedic texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fishermen, knaves, etc.
Also, from the words of the Mantra (it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).
And it is also (so) stated in the Smriti (Bhagavad Gita).
The Supreme Self is not (affected by pleasure and pain) like this (individual soul), even as light etc. (are not affected by the shape of the things they touch).
The Smritis also state (that).
Injunctions and prohibitions (are possible) on account of the connection (of the Self) with the body, as in the case of light etc.
And on account of the non-extension (of the soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of results of actions).
And (the individual soul or self is) only a reflection (of the Supreme Self).
There being no fixity about the unseen principle (there would result that confusion for those who believe in many souls, each all-pervading).
And even as regards resolve etc, (it would be) like this.
If it be said (that the distinction of pleasure and pain etc. results) from (the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account of the self being in all bodies.
Likewise, the organs (are produced from Brahman).
On account of the impossibility (of explaining the origination in a) secondary sense.
And because that (the verb denoting origin) is mentioned first (in connection with the Pranas).
On account of the pre-existence of that (viz. the elements) (before) the organ of speech (etc.).
(The organs are) seven (in number), because it is so known (from the scriptures) and on account of the specification (of those seven).
But hands etc. (are also referred to as sense-organs in scriptural texts). Since this is a fact, therefore (it is) not like this (i.e., they are not merely seven in number).
And (they are) minute.
And the chief Prana (vital force) (is also produced).
(The chief Prana) is neither air nor any function (of the organs) on account of its being mentioned separately.
But (Prana is subordinate to the soul) like eyes etc. on account of (its) being taught with them and for other reasons.
And on account of (its) not being an instrument (there is) no objection, because thus (the scripture) teaches.
It (Prana) is taught as having a fivefold function like the mind.
And it is minute.
But there is the presiding over by Fire and others (over the organs), on account of the scriptural teaching about that.
(The gods are not the enjoyers, but the soul, because the organs are connected) with the one (i.e., the soul) possessing them, (as is known) from the scriptures.
And on account of its (soul’s) permanence (in the body it is the enjoyer, and not the gods).
They (the other Pranas) except the chief (Prana) are organs (and so different from the chief Prana), on account of (their) being so designated (by the scriptures).
On account of differentiating scriptural texts.
And (the organs are different from Prana) because of the dissimilarity in characteristics.
The arrangement of designation and shape, however, is by Him who made the elements tripartite, for it is taught (in the Upanishad).
Flesh etc. result from earth, according to the scriptures. So also, as regards the other two (viz. fire and water).
But on account of the preponderance (of a particular element in them the gross elements), are so named (after it).
